As NASA and its space partners endeavor to develop a network of satellites capable of supporting humankind's needs for advanced space weather prediction and understanding, one of the key challenges is to design a space system to operate in the natural space radiation environment In this paper, we present a description of the natural space radiation environment, the effects of interest to electronic or pl~otonic systems, and a sample of emerging technologies and their specific issues. We conclude with a discussion of operations in the space radiation hazard and considerations for risk management.
Introduction
Among the most challenging aspects of developing systems for space is the performance of electronic and photonic systems in the natural space radiation environment' One should note that the radiation hazard for a specific mission is not generic: each mission orbit, timeframe, duration, and spacecraft design implications (i.e., the varying amount of structural shielding in differing satellite configurations) derive unique requirements and challenges to the system design. This natural space radiation hazard varies significantly: from missions with severe requirements that fly in the heart of the Van Allen belts where trapped energetic particles lurk. One such example would be a medium earth orbit or MEO. to avionics systems in the upper atmosphere that are protected from many energetic particle concerns, but still must deal with secondary particles such as neutrons. The concept of an error occurring in critical electronics of a manned aircraft is unsettling at best. * This paper is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
Long and short term radiation effects such as total ionizing dose (TID), displacement damage dose (DDD), and single event effects (SEE) provide aerospace designers' a myriad of challenges for reliable system design.
Adding' complication to this concern is the use of new, emerging, and in some cases unproven technologies that often have new or increased susceptibility to radiation concerns.* In this paper, we attempt to provide a basic understanding of the natural space radiation environment's effects on technology as well as a discussion of the implications of such effects and risk management techniques available to cope with them.
Two items should be noted as well. The first is that we are discussing the natural space radiation environment and not the induced radiation environment that is of concern for military applications. The second is that the technology focus of this paper is on electronic and photonic technologies. TIus is not to say that other technology concerns do not exist, simply that it is outside the scope of this presentation.
The Natural Suace Radiation Hazkd The near-Earth natural radiation environment can be divided into two categories, the particles trapped in the Van Allen belts and the transient environment. Fig. 1 shows a representation of the environment population. The particles trapped in the near-Earth environment are composed of energetic protons, electrons, and heavy . .
ions. The -onsi st s of gala-osmic ray particles and particles from solar events (coronal mass ejections and flares). The cosmic rays have lowlevel fluxes with energies up to TeV and include all ions in the periodic table. The solar eruptions produce energetic protons, alpha particles, heavy ions, and electrons. To the first order, all of these particle populations are omnidirectional and isotropic.
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Space also contains a low energy lasma of electrons Pz and protons with fluxes up to 10 cm2/sec. In the trapped particle regions, the pl&ma is the low energy (< 0.1 MeV) component of the charged particles. In the outer regions of the magnetosphere and in interplanetary space, the plasma is associated with the solar wind. Because of its low energy, the plasma is easily stopped by thin layers of material so it is not a hazard to most spacecraft electronics. However, it is Galactic Cosmic It1v Heaw Ions The flux levels of the galactic cosmic rays (GCRs) are low cornpared to the trapped particles, but they are l w d o u s to spacecraft electronics because their high energies make tlletn extremely penetrating. Also, they laveJa lugh rate of energy deposition as measured by their linear energy transfer (LET) rate. A particle's LET is primarily dependent on the density of the target material and, to a lesser degree, the density and thickness of the shielding material. It is their high LET that makes cosmic rays an important contributor to single event effects problems for spacecraft, especially in orbits where the magnetosphere offers little protection.
The total dose deposition in silicon is only 10 rads/year when the GCR environment is at its peak. However, when the GCR dose is converted to dose equivalent in units of rem for biological systems, it can reach dangerous levels for humans. This can be true even for low earth orbits where tile effect of the magnetospleric attenuation on the fluence levels of cosmic ray particles is significant. 
Trauued Protons and Electrons
The trapped particles pose a signscant radiation threat to electronic systems and humans. There are large variations in the level of hazard depending on the orbit of the spacecraft, solar activity, and magnetospheric conditions. Both the protons and electrons contribute to total ionizing dose damage. For some electronic parts, single event effects induced by protons are also a hazard Protons also contribute to degradation due to non-ionizing energy loss. Protons are especially problematic because of their high energies and penetrating power. As mentioned above, low energy electrons are the cause of electrostatic discharging which can be a serious problem for spacecraft in higher altitude orbits (e.g., geostationaryj where they-are exposed to more intense electron populations. Higher energy electrons can penetrate into the spacecraft, collect in insulator materials, and discharge causing damage to electronics. In fact, an analysis of system anomalies from the CRRES satellite showed that most of the anomalies were related to deep dielectric discharging.' upsets on stverd satellites during solar events and quiet times. For &stems that must opemte during a solar particle event, the effect that both the solar protons and the solar heavy-ions lms on single effects rates must be evaluated. The heavier ions make only a very small contribution to the dose levels. However, single event effects induced by solar heavy ions pose a serious problem for spacecraft systems that must operate during a solar event, because the particle levels are orders of 2 A~nerican Institute of Aeronautics ' and Astronautics, September 25-29, 2000, Long Beach CA magnitude higher than the background galactic cosmic DDD is essentially the cumulative degradation resulting rays. For tile systems tlmt must operate during a solar from the displacement of nuclei in a material from their particle event, the effect that both the solar protons and lattice position. Over time, suFficient displacement can the heavy-ions has on single effects rates needs to be occur and may change the device or material evaluated-It is especially important to take the peak performance properties. Prime sources of DDD exposure flux levels into When setting part include trapped protons, solar protons, radioisotope requirements and guidelines* One must tllermoelectric generator (RTG) neutrons, and to a lesser remember that peak solar particle conditions exist for extent for typically elecmnic systems, only a small part of the totill mission time. ' electrons.
Protons from solar particle events also contribute to total dose and solar cell damage especially for interplanetary missions and those at geostationary and in geostationary transfer orbits. Adams et al. measured doses with RADFETs on the Meteosat-3 and found that doses increased a factor of 20 with the onset of the October 1989 event.'
Natural Soace Radiation Effects on Teclmolom
The effects from the natural space radiation environment may be divided into two categories: long-term and shortterm. The long-term effects have two separate concerns: ionizing and non-ionizing damage. Short-term effects are concerned primarily with single particle ionization andfor secondary particle formation. One should note that even short-term effects may be permanent (i.e., destructive single particle events).
Alternatively, one may view ionizing radiation effects in space electronics in two parts: total ionizing dose (TID) and single event effects (SEE)." The two effects are distinct, as are their requirements and mitigation techniques. Though these effects are often a prime driver when discussing mission requirements, the non-ionizing radiation effects such as displacement damlge dose (DDD) must also be ~onsidered.'~ TID -TID is a long-term degradation of electronics due to the cumulative energy deposited in a material. Typical effects include parametric failures, or variations in device parameters such as leakage current, tlxeshold voltage, etc., or functional failures. Significant sources of TID exposure in the space environment include trapped electrons, trapped protons, and solar protons. DDD DDD often has similar long-term degradation characteristics to TID, but is a separate physical mechanism It should be noted that teclmologies tlnt are tolerant to TID are NOT necessarily toler'mt to DDD.
SEEs
SEES occur when a single ion strikes a material, depositing sufficient energy either through its prime strike (e.g., direct ionization via GCR) or by the secondary particles that occur from the strike (e.g., indirect ionization via protons) to cause an effect in the device. The many types of SEE may be divided into two main categories: soft errors and hard errors.
In general, a soft error occurs when a transient pulse or bit-flip in the device causes an error detectable at the device output. Therefore, soft errors are entirely device and design specific, and are best categorized by their impact on the device. This is briefly shown in Table 1 . An SEU that causes a conuption in device/system operation A single particle induced spike on the output of structure such as an operational amplifier or combinatorial logic.
Sample Impact
Location-specific: can corrupt program flow or data content. May halt system and require a reset or power cycling to clear Applicationspecific pending the shape of the transient and it's effect on follow-on circuitry.
Hard errors may bebut are not necessarilyphysically destructive to the device, and may cause permanent hnctional effects. TIDDDD Device parametric and permanent functional degradations are the principal failure modes of electronics associated with the TIDDDD environment.
Since TIDIDDD are cumulative effects, radiation tolerances of devices are akin to mean-time-to-failure (M'l'TF) numbers. This is where the time-to-failure is the amount of mission time until the device has encountered sufficient dose to cause failure. It should be noted that degradation may be gradual or rather abrupt. Two examples illustrate this. The first is an increase in device leakage current that might gradually double in a year's period or in a single orbit. The second is when sporadic errors begin occumng after a year in orbit as opposed to a hard failure that suddenly occurs.
devices.
A reduction in the breakdown voltage of a parasitic transistor that is caused by the injection of minority camers from the source diffusion to the well. Snapback also causes local loss of functional operation, along with an increase in current. However, much smaller currents generally occur as a result of snapback as compared to SEL.
Factors such as the mission's orbit, launch date, and launch length determine the external radiation environment. The device exposure to this lizard is then determined by the amount of shielding between the device and this external environment. Specific requirements and design considerations are therefore based on device location on or within the spacecraft.
SEE -
Unlike TID/DDD tolerances, SEE rates are probabilistic, given as a predicted span of time witlin &licli a SEE will randomly occur. That is to say, SEE rate predictions are mean-time-between failures (MTBF) as opposed to m.
The system-level impact of SEE depends on the type and location of the effect (hard or soft, recoverable or not), as well as on the specific system design. Hard errors, naturally, are of great concern to system reliability, since they may not be recoverable. Soft error effects such as the propagation of an SET or SEU tluougli a circuit, subsystem, and system may also be of particular importance. For example, a device error or failure may propagate to critical mission elements, such as a command error affecting a thruster firing. There are also cases where SEES may have little or no observable effect on a system level. In fact, in most designs, there are specific areas in which SEUs have less system impact from certain radiation effects. A data storage recorder utilizing a powerful error detection and correction (EDAC) code scheme would fit this category. It is important to note that, in general, shielding is not radiation concerns. In Ule following section, we'll an effective mitigation tool for SEE, unless a device is discuss some ways of reducing the risk of using these soft to attenuable protons.
technologies.
Sample Effects on Emerginn Technolopies
In an effort to increase space system performance in an era of reducing resources, many emerging teclnologies are being considered for space systems. Unfortunately, many of these teclnologies have increased or new radiation sensitivities." In addition, spacecraft size is shrinking andlor using newer composite materials. This provides less effective shielding for sensitive electronics. In summary, we are using more sensitive devices with less protection.
All is not lost, however. In this section, we'll describe a sampling of emerging technologies and some of their A general trend will be pointed out: as systems are going faster (data rates > 1 gigabit per second or gbps), the SEUISET sensitivities appear to be increasing. However, as will be discussed later, the impact of the error on a system must be evaluated to determine applicability.
Microelectronics are a staple of space system design. 
Another burgeoning arm of teclulology insertion into
It should be noted that DDD issues must be carefully space systems is photonics. With technologies such as looked at in Uus same manner. An energetic proton as it exoticdoped fiber amplifiers and gbps fiber links being tr'ansits a material may lose energy, but that reduced used, one must pay attention to radiation issues as well.
energy may be Inore hnaging ~L W the original proton's energy. This is a very complex issue outside of the scope components in a fiber system (detectors, of this falk. Thus, we will emplmix mitigation transmitters, and optical fiber) should be considered for tecldiques as opposed to ale DDD issue. their radiation effects. A summary of radiation lessons learned has already been presented and we' refer the interested reader to this reference for further detail.I4
A second point is that most pilotonic links require a high-speed electrical interface. In many cases, the radiation performance of these electronics can be the limiting factor for the system."
Managing Risk: Mitigation and A C C~D~M C~ of Radiation Effects Risks". l6 TIDDDD TIDDDD requirements are met through many avenues. Naturally, the first option is to procure devices hardened to the environment. This is also true for SEE. Unfortunately, hardened electronics technology can be mcult to obtain (cost, schedule) and lag significantly behind that of commercial technologies (two orders of magnitude or greater).
Shielding is an effective TID mitigation tool but may be costly in terms of the added weight to tlle spacecraft. The radiation environment external to the spacecraft is reduced and modified by the amount and types of materials between the external environment and the electronic device of interest. The spacecraft, instrument, electronic boxes, and any other material substance can all contribute to shielding. Representing these structures in a three-dimensional radiation model provides the means of calculating TID via 3-D ray trace methods at the component level or electronic box level. For critical missions or missions with high radiation environments, it is recommended to schedule a 3-D ray trace prediction close to the beginning of the preliminary design phase, when the spacecraft geometry is reasonably well defined and the boxes are arranged into the structure. With tlus method, component level and /or box level TID requirements can be set for the design. TID requirements stemming from this effort will be more accurate, and usually lower, than from an ideal geometry calculation, allowing for a more efficient design. Over-specifying tolerance requirements can be avoided with subsequent savings in costs. This overall process determines the effective shielding for a component and typically reduces the lwdness required by a component Slight redesign at the spacecraft andlor subsystem level may reduce TID exposure levels without necessarily impacting the overall weight budget. Electronic boxes placed inside a spacecraft structure receive additional radiation shielding from the spacecraft when compared to those on the outside of the structure. In addition, electronic boxes placed closer together provide more shielding to each other than boxes further apart. Internal box structures and components also provide shielding. In essence, optimizing the mechanical box layout (location o d i the spacecraft) and devices within a box (where inside the box the component is located), provides a useful mecans of understanding or mitigating risk.
In some cases, the effective shielding may not be sufficient to reduce the TID requirement. In these cases, additional shielding may be added to the spacecraft with all the potential meclmical, thermal, and other design and cost constraints that one would expect. Some device packaging techniques are designed to increase radiation tolerance. However, these devices are typically costly and have long lead times for procurement. At a device level, spot shielding offers the least impact on the weight budget. However, for electronic boxes in which large amounts of circuitry must be protected, box-level shielding may be the only practical method of reducing dose through shielding.
Devices
with unknown radiation tolerance characteristics should be replaced by alternates with known tolerance or else tested to TID or DDD as appropriate. Radiation testing of key devices with unknown tolemce early in the design phase reduces the risk of schedule and cost impacts required for circuit redesign andlor work-arounds. Although device TID tolerance may vary by a factor of two or more from lot to lot, look ahead testing of devices gives insights into their use. In later development phases, testing of the flight lot parts is critical for commercial grade devices to account for issues such as the lot-to-lot variations that ofien occur.
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Americ'ul Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Scptelnber 25-29.2000, Long Beach CA Redund'ancy of colnponcrits is often considered as well as a me' ans of mitigation. Redundancy with powered-on devices is not effective as mitigation, since these devices will also degrade at the same rate. Un-powered devices may or may not provide a means of mitigation (degradation may be less, more, or the same); this is very device and technology specific.
SEE
For simplicity, SEES, may be divided into four categories: those that effect data or data streams, those that effect the operation or control of the system, transients, and destructive. There is some obvious overlap such as a bit error in a memory cell that can either be a data error or an error in a stored program (which affects operation).
It is also important to note t l d some SEES may be acceptable when you look at mission requirements. An SEU rate causing a loss of 5% of tile science data may be acceptable.
On the other hand, one also needs to understand when the payloads are required to gather data. For example, if a mission is looking to gather data during a solar particle event, a nominally accepted SEE rate (say, once a day) may not be acceptable during this event time period.
Data
There are several options for data-related SEU mitigation using encoding schemes on the device or data structure. First, parity checking is a "detect only" scheme, which counts the number of logic one states occurring in a data set, producing a single parity bit saying whether an odd or even number of ones were in that structure." This scheme will flag an SEU if an odd number of bits are in error, but not if an even number of bits are in error.
A second option, Hamming code, is known as single bit correct, double bit detect. The use of EDAC schemes such as this, known as scrubbing, is common among current solid-state recorders flying in space [for example, refs '8. '9] . Hamming code schemes encode an entire block of data with a check code; this method will detect the position of a single error, and Uie existence of more than one error in a data structure." Because the SEU position is known; it is possible to correct this error. This coding method is recommended for systems with low probabilities of multiple errors in a single data structure (e.g., only a single bit in error in a byte of data).
Otltcr block error codes provide more powerful error correcting codes (ECCs). Alllong these, Reed-Solomon (R-S) coding is becoming widespread in its usage.*' The R-S code is able to detect and correct multiple and consecutive errors in a data structure. An example [ref 2'] is wlkzt is known as (255,223), or a 255 byte block with 223 bytes of data and 32 bytes of overhead. This particular R-S scheme is able to correct up to 16 consecutive bytes in error, and is available in a single IC designed by the NASA VLSI Design Center.*' A modified R-S code for a SSR has been performed by software as Convolutional encoding differs from block coding by interleaving the overhead or check bits into the actual data stream rather than being grouped into word^.^ This provides good immunity for mitigating isolated burst noise, and is particularly useful in communication systems'.
Mitigation may also be performed at the system level or with an overlying system protocol. Typical error detection schemes as described above may be used, and error correction may be accomplished by rewriting or retransmitting data. A combination of EDAC techniques may be most effective.
The above methods provide ways of reducing the effective bit error rate @ER) of data storage areas such as solid-state recorders and communication paths or data interconnects. Table 4 summarizes sample EDAC methods for memory or data devices and systems.
Control
The above techniques are useful for data SEUs, and may also be applicable to some types of control SEUs as well. Highly integrated devices such as VLSI circuitry or microprocessors leave the system potentially more vulnerable to hazards such as issuing an incorrect H&S tasks may include memory scrubbing with parity or other code methods on external devices, or on registers internal to the microprocessor. They also might use internal hardware timers to set watchdog timers (some type of message is sent indicating health of a device or system) or to pass H&S messages between spacecraft systems.
Redundancy between circuits, boxes, systems, etc. provides a potential means of recovery from an SEE on a system. Autonomous or ground-controlled switching from a prime system to a redundant spare may provide system designers an option, depending on spacecraft power and weight restrictions. Alternately, lockstep operation uses two identical circuits performing identical operations with synchronized clocking, a technique often used with ~nicro~rocessors.~~ Errors are detected when the processor outputs do not agree, implying that a potential SEU has occurred. The system then has the option of reinitializing, etc. However. for longer spacecraft mission time frames, lockstep circuits using commercial devices may cause TID-induced problems; clock skew with increasing dosage may cause false triggers when the lockstep devices respond to the dosage differently. Voting takes lockstep systems one step further: with three identical circuits, choose the output that at least two agree upon. Katz, et al. provide an excellent example. 26 They have proposed and SEUtested a triple modular redundancy (TMR) voting scheme for FPGAs. FPGAs provide higher gate counts and device logic densities than older LSI circuits; while this reduces the IC count for spacecraft electrical designs, with the TMR scheme you essentially lose over two-thirds of the available FPGA's gates.
Good engineering practices for spacecraft provide other means of mitigation.27 Utilizing redundant command structures (two commands trigger an event with different data or addresses), signal power margins, etc. may aid an SEU hardening scheme. These and other good engineering practices usually allow designers to be innovative and discover sufficient methods for SEU mitigation as needed. Unknown device or system SEE characteristics provide the greatest risk to a system and conversely, the greatest challenge to an electrical designer.
SETs
Standard filtering techniques such as R-C filter circuits are effective means of reducing or eliminating SETS. Several things should be noted, however. Fist, SETS can be very application specific. For example, an analog comqarator may have vastly different SET sensitivity in tenns of transient slupe and occurrence rates based on the circuit bias, power supply, etc ... Second, adding filters can reduce the bandwidth of a circuit (i.e., the size of a valid pulse must be large enough to pass through the filter).
Destructive Issues
Destructive conditions may or may not be recoverable depending on the individual device. Hardening from the system level is difficult at best, and in most cases, not particularly effective, due to several concerns. First, non-recoverable destructive events such SEGR or SEB require redundant devices or systems to be in place since the devices fail when tlus occurs. SEL may or may not have this same effect and is very device specific. Microlatch, in particular, is to detect since the current consumption of this condition may be within that of nonnal device operation. LaBel has demonstrated the use of multiple watchdog timeout conditions as a potential mitigation scheme.28 A similar concern exists if current limiting is performed on a card or higher integration level: a single device may see SEL at a high enough current to destroy itself, but not at a sufficient current to trigger the overcurrent protection on the card. Current limiting circuits to cycle power on individual devices are often considered, but failure modes of this protection circuit are sometimes worse than finding a less SEL-sensitive device (e.g., infinite loop of power cycling may occur). Hence, SEL should be treated by the designer on a case-by-case basis considering the device's SEL response, circuit design, aid protection methods. A risky method of SEL protection on SELvulnerable devices involves reading the device's current periodically, and cycling power if the current exceeds a specified limit. Tlus method can use either telemetry points or device calibration parameters to be successfi~l.~~ 
Sum~nary
We have presented an overview of the natural space radiation environment, its effects and how they relate to emerging technologies, and finally, a treatise on radiation risk reduction for electronics systems. The expectations are that as teclmologies evolve and emerge, new effects and concerns may be expected.
